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PERSONAL NETWORKS AND PARTY AFFILIATION IN STATUS 
ATTAINMENT PROCESSES IN CUBA: HOW DO INDIVIDUALS 
END UP IN ECONOMICALLY PROFITABLE POSITIONS IN 
EMERGENT SECTORS?
Sara Romanò
From 1990 to the early 2000s, in order to solve the 
sudden crisis caused by the collapse of the USSR, the 
Cuban government prioritized the reconstruction of 
the international tourism sector and the development 
of telecommunications services and nickel mining 
(Pérez-Villanueva, 2004). To this end, it enforced 
policies aimed at attracting direct foreign invest-
ments, mainly from Canada and Europe. At the same 
time, the Cuban government legalized new forms of 
self-employment1 in order to boost productivity and 
incorporate a part of the growing informal economy 
into the formal economy (Henken, 2005). 
As a result of crisis and reforms, Cuban socio-eco-
nomic structures have changed. New economic sec-
tors, the so-called emergent sectors, appeared and, 
more generally the services and primary sectors grew, 
while the secondary sector decayed (Espina-Prieto 
and Togores-González, 2012). Moreover, inequality 
started to grow and a process of social re-stratifica-
tion occurred (Ranis and Kosak, 2004; Mesa-Lago, 
2004; Espina-Prieto, 2004; Romanò, 2012). Studies 
on inequality carried out in Cuba show that in the 
Cuban labor market, the emergent sectors provide 
the most economically-profitable occupations (Espi-
na-Prieto, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2010; Espina-Prieto 
and Togores-González, 2012; Zabala, 2010; Henk-
en, 2000, 2002, 2008; Corrales, 2004). In effect, a 
recent study by the Center for Psychological and So-
ciological Studies (CIPS, hereafter), a research center 
affiliated with the Ministry of Science, Technology 
and Environment, notes that Cubans associate the 
attainment of economically advantageous position in 
emergent sectors to paths of upward mobility (Espi-
na-Prieto and Togores-González, 2012). Therefore, 
in the paper I will use the terms profitable and desir-
able interchangeably.
In the evolving socio-economic structures briefly de-
scribed above, control of specific resources (e.g., edu-
cation, expertise, information, influence) has enabled 
some individuals to move to new employment or 
new occupational positions, while others who lacked 
such control remained stuck in their traditional posi-
tions. In the Cuban labor market the more economi-
cally profitable positions do not necessarily coincide 
with the more prestigious ones; therefore, restrictions 
were established to avoid skilled technicians or pro-
fessionals from traditional sectors (i.e., doctors and 
other health workers, professors and teachers) mi-
grating towards more gainful jobs in order to cope 
better with the effects of the crisis. To this end, the 
government has strengthened the restrictions limit-
ing job changes between ministries. In order to be 
1. The non-state sector widened with the enactment of Decree Law 141 of 1992, which authorized the exercise of self-employment for 
a wide range of activities.
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hired by an enterprise or institution a job seeker must 
show his or her work-record. Applicants to emergent 
sector jobs or those seeking self-employment licenses 
must also have a clean criminal record, especially if 
they are expected to work in front-offices, interacting 
with foreigners.
Taking the above-mentioned basic factors into ac-
count, this paper will try to answer the following 
question: how do individuals reach the economically 
profitable state-jobs in emergent sectors? To answer 
this question I will focus on the role of party affilia-
tion and personal networks in the labor market. Be-
fore formulating the hypotheses, I will first review 
what is already known about inequality in mixed so-
cialist economies and in Cuban society as well. 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON SOCIAL 
MOBILITY IN REFORMING STATE 
SOCIALISM
Although the study of social mobility relies on a long 
tradition in sociology, unfortunately Cuban data do 
not allow a state-of-the-art, fully comprehensive 
analysis of social mobility at a national level. More-
over, social mobility studies lack a tradition in Cuba. 
Just recently, the CIPS has begun to participate in an 
international academic cooperation project on meth-
ods to investigate the macro-structural dimensions 
and the micro-mechanisms of social mobility (Espi-
na-Prieto, 2012).
Traditional studies on social mobility develop statis-
tical models to estimate the effects of different indi-
vidual attributes (typically, social origin, education 
attained, sex, race) on status attained (Marshall, 
1998; Goldthorpe, 2007). Evidence from social mo-
bility research supports the socialist ideology thesis 
that posits that the social and economic policies en-
forced by socialist governments generate both a weak 
direct link between social origin and educational at-
tainment and a strong link between attained educa-
tion and occupational status (Grusky and Hauser 
1984; Yaish and Andersen 2012; Krymkowsky, 
1991; Sieben and De Graaf, 2001; Erikson and 
Goldthorpe, 1992).
Social origin and education attained, however, ex-
plain only part of professional success in socialist so-
cieties. Due to the fact that in a planned economy 
Party administrators not only have the authority to 
redistribute income, but also to allocate jobs, Party 
affiliation can interfere with the social status attain-
ment processes (Moore, 1989; Connor 1979; Cliff, 
1974; Djilas, 1957; Kalleberg, 1988; Parkin, 1976; 
Szelenyi, Beckett and King 1994; Walder, 1985; 
1986). Moreover, Party membership constitutes a 
political credential of trustworthiness that should be 
rewarded.
While being a Party member makes it more likely for 
an individual to enjoy some career opportunities, or 
economic benefits, Party membership does not auto-
matically and homogeneously lead to a status imply-
ing a greater ability to control resources (Szelenyi, 
1987). Therefore, the direct or indirect role played 
by Party membership in status attainment processes 
is a complex matter, both in socialist and in transi-
tion societies (Walder, 1995; Nee, 1991; 1996; 
Szelenyi and Kostello, 1996; Gerber, 2002; Rona-
Tas, 1994; Staniszkis, 1991). Szelenyi (1982) argued 
that in the so-called second stage of socialist societies, 
the relationship between Party membership and high 
status positions (mainly managerial and professional 
positions) is spurious, as the main factor explaining 
both the occupational attainment and Party mem-
bership is education (see also Konrad and Szelenyi, 
1979). Yet, some interplay processes between Party 
affiliation and status attainment can be reasonably 
presumed. Nevertheless, available data do not permit 
to clearly unravel these processes.
According to evidence from reforming state social-
ism, Party membership at most seems to directly in-
terfere with the attainment of managerial positions in 
state organizations.2 In a study carried out in China, 
Walder (1995) found that both Party membership 
and education positively affected the chances of be-
coming an administrator, but the impact of political 
credentials is greater — up to 10 times — than that of 
the educational degree. Conversely, high-level profes-
sionals are not screened according to political creden-
tials: in fact, college education is the strongest predic-
tor of entry into a professional occupation whereas 
Party membership is not significant. Taking into ac-
count that high professionals are not screened ac-
cording to political credentials, it becomes possible to 
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suppose that Party affiliation is also not a necessary 
credential for the attainment of occupations of lower 
profile.
While international research programs on inequality 
in reforming state socialism are focused on the role 
Party affiliation plays in the attainment of desirable 
positions, the literature on inequality in Cuba is al-
most silent about this matter. To the best of my 
knowledge, there are no empirical studies carried out 
in Cuba focusing on the relation between Party affili-
ation and the attainment of advantageous positions 
in emergent sectors.
From a network perspective, opportunities for mo-
bility are conceived of as a function of information 
and influence that are embedded in and mobilized 
from one’s social networks (Granovetter,1988; Gra-
novetter and Sweberg, 2001; Lin, Walter and 
Vaughn 1981; Lin, 1999, 2004; Flap, 1988). Thus, 
studies from this perspective focus on the role per-
sonal contacts play in labor markets. 
Studies from a network perspective have been carried 
out mainly in China and Russia (Bian, 2002; Bian, 
Breiger, Davis and Galaskiewicz, 2005; Bian and 
Soon, 1997; Gerber, 2010; Huang, 2008; Yakubo-
vich, 2006; Rona-Tas, 1994). They show that effec-
tively an individual who turns to personal contacts 
has a better chance of obtaining an advantageous po-
sition in the labor market (Gerber, 2010; Huang, 
2008; Yakubovich, 2006). As in capitalist societies, 
in China personal networks facilitate all three aspects 
of occupational process: entry into the labor force, 
inter-firm mobility and re-employment after being 
laid off (Bian, 2002). Moreover, Huang’s (2008) in-
terviews in China suggest that networks play a great-
er role in the state sector than in the private sector. 
Similarly, initial findings from Cuba suggest that job 
selection via informal channels is rather common 
practice (Echevarría-León 2008; Espina-Prieto and 
Togores-González, 2012). The CIPS’s interviews 
suggest that personal networks are decisive to reach 
advantageous positions: the decisive prerequisites to 
get such desirable jobs combine high qualifications 
with the use of personal contacts who can provide in-
formation about job opportunities as well as refer-
ences that facilitate the entrance in this new sector 
(see Espina-Prieto and Togores-González, 2012).
Studies on social capital carried out in capitalist soci-
eties suggest that an individual that can mobilize 
weak ties (Granovetter, 1973) and high status con-
tacts (Lin, 1999; 2004) to conduct his or her job 
search has better chance of reaching desirable occu-
pations. In contrast with what occurs in capitalist so-
cieties, however, initial results from China suggest 
that strong ties are the most valuable resource in fa-
cilitating occupational attainment. This is so because 
in socialist societies, strong ties secure influence from 
authorities, an asset that is more difficult to obtain 
than just information (Bian, 2002). Similarly, initial 
findings from CIPS’s study suggest that individuals 
embedded in better-educated families (i.e., individu-
als who can mobilize strong ties in high status posi-
tions) are more likely to succeed in the job market 
(Espina-Prieto and Togores-González, 2012).
Moreover, CIPs’s studies showed that sex and skin 
color are among the individual attributes that could 
bar the movement of individuals into desirable occu-
pations (ibidem).
2. On the contrary, research findings from post-socialist countries in East Europe show that the Party elite (or its specific segments, 
typically technocratic cadres) had better chances of getting jobs in dynamic and profitable private sectors (Rona-Tas 1994; Staniszkis, 
1991). According to Szelenyi and Kostello (1998), mixed results about the role of Party affiliation in the attainment of desirable occu-
pations (Nee, 1996; Cao and Nee, 2000) can be accounted for by the diverse kinds of market penetration in reforming state socialism 
and post-socialist societies (see also Szelenyi and Kostello, 1996). After the political turn, or more generally when privatization policies 
are enacted and private accumulation begins to be tolerated, Party members start to engage in the private sector. Under these condi-
tions, cadres enjoy two decisive advantages. First, they can rely on their influence to obtain licenses for themselves (or their offspring). 
Second, they can commodify their bureaucratic privileges to create new income opportunities for themselves outside the planned econ-
omy. These two advantages explain why research findings from East Europe, where the political turn occurred, show that ex-Party 
members had more chances to engage in profitable private sectors. 
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THEORIES AND HYPOTHESES 
Empirical Question and Hypotheses 
Until now I have briefly reviewed the literature on 
social mobility in reforming state socialism, in order 
to identify those possible key factors — such as indi-
vidual attributes, Party affiliation, personal 
network — affecting the attainment of desirable oc-
cupations. Taking these factors into account, I will 
formulate hypotheses on how individuals reach the 
more economically profitable positions in Cuba. 
As stated above, from a network perspective, oppor-
tunities for mobility stem from information and in-
fluence obtained from one’s social networks (Gra-
novetter, 1973; Bian, 2002). Taking into account 
that the value of social resources (information and in-
fluence, as in the case of social mobility) depends on 
the institutional conditions (Volker, 1995), scholars 
studying mobility in reforming state socialism sug-
gest that the most valuable resource to attain a desir-
able job is the influence of authorities. From this 
viewpoint, the information about a vacancy per se 
might not be a valuable resource for occupational at-
tainment in socialist societies. Therefore, Bian 
(2002) suggests that in China’s reforming state so-
cialism, strong ties, rather than weak ties, allow to 
complete a successful job search. As seen above, al-
though studies carried out in Cuba do not focus on 
the nature of contacts mobilized to reach desirable 
occupations, initial findings from CIPS’s study in 
Cuba are rather consistent with Bian’s (2002) hy-
pothesis. 
Moreover, Bian’s (2002) argument about the 
“strength of strong ties” is relatively consistent with 
the so-called sociolismo culture existing in Cuba. So-
cios (a Cuban term almost equivalent to “associate” 
or “friend”) are those personal close contacts that an 
individual uses in order to perform her/his instru-
mental actions. These socios are useful sources of 
trustworthy information about job opportunities 
and, at the same time, willing providers of references 
for employers. More generally, socios represent both a 
trustworthy source of information and a useful gate-
keeper to reach reliable providers of items that are in 
short supply. People often mobilize socios when try-
ing to bend the institutional and formal rules, but 
sometimes they activate them even just to expedite or 
ensure the attainment of “licitly” desirable items. Cu-
bans “inherit” socios from their relatives and acquire 
them by attending institutional contexts, such as 
school, workplace, neighborhood, etc. In other 
words, in Cuba “instrumental” mating often stems 
from meeting in institutional contexts generating 
strong ties. 
Taking the above into account, the first hypothesis to 
be tested is: 
Hypothesis 1: Consistent with the strength of 
strong ties argument, other things being equal, an 
individual who turns to strong ties in his or her job-
search is more likely to attain economically profit-
able positions such as state-employment in emer-
gent sectors.
As discussed above, the domestic literature on social 
mobility in Cuba is rather silent about the effect of 
Party affiliation on the attainment of economically 
profitable positions, be they in traditional or emer-
gent sectors. Conversely, the international literature 
is rather focused on whether Party affiliation facili-
tates the attainment of economically profitable posi-
tions in state or private sectors. Thus, in order to 
place the Cuban case within the international litera-
ture, the exploration of this topic in Cuba becomes 
almost inescapable. To this end, first I will present 
some considerations about what being a Party mem-
ber means in term of cost-benefits, then I will present 
my hypothesis. 
In Cuba, “[Party] membership must be sought out, 
and there are typically two paths to consideration for 
membership: having been selected as a ‘vanguard 
worker’ or having distinguished oneself previously in 
the UJC”3 (Henken, 2008:221). The waiting period 
for UJC members to apply for consideration to be-
come Party members is two years (Henken, 2008). 
People who apply for consideration are screened with 
regards to private life, familiar background, activism 
in institutional associations and participation in 
neighborhood-life (i.e., Committee for the Defense 
3. UJC is the acronym of the Youth Communist Union.
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of the Revolution, CDR, Federation of Cuban 
Women, FMC, etc), job, educational careers and po-
litical record. 
Due to the fact that the formal path to become a Par-
ty member is rather costly in terms of individual ef-
forts necessary to meet the Party standards, not all 
those who desire to become Party members can do 
so. Moreover, once one has full membership, efforts 
to meet Party standard continue. In general, they in-
clude participation in meetings, participation in vol-
untary work, cooperation with Party officials, and 
displaying the appropriate political and personal be-
havior, and so on.
In addition, Party members must set good examples 
to colleagues, neighbors and friends with regard to 
consistency with socialist ideals. A Party member has 
to be accountable to compañeros for her/his public 
and private life. Last, but not least, in the event that a 
Party member lacks labor discipline, the Party applies 
sanctions more severe than standard sanctions. In 
their efforts to meet the socialist ideals (including 
leading an honest and simple life), Party members 
observe and evaluate each other. Moreover, as in any 
hierarchical organization, members are subject to ob-
servation and evaluation by superiors. Thus, a Party 
member is confronted with formal and informal con-
trol and (dis)approval more so than other persons not 
involved in the Party. Seen in this perspective, Party 
affiliation becomes a recognizable credential of polit-
ical trustworthiness: by continuously observing its 
own members, the Party checks political trustworthi-
ness. 
As discussed above, getting into the Party is rather 
costly; but getting out of the Party could be more 
costly still. A member who applies to leave the Party 
must explain the motivations for such a decision. 
His/her motivations must be reasonably grounded to 
avoid a negative political record. Grounded motiva-
tions to leave the Party could be, for example, retire-
ment from job, poor personal health or a demonstra-
ble necessity to attend to one’s own relatives. 
Due to the organizational structure of the Party, ev-
ery Party cell is linked to a given workplace (e.g., 
UJC cells may be linked to educational centers). For 
this reason, the movement of a Party member in the 
labor market has to be mapped out by the Party. 
When changing jobs, Party members need to obtain 
an authorization in the form of an introduction letter 
from the current Party cell and receive an acceptance 
letter from the receiving cell. 
Every Party cell discusses topics related to its work-
place, but obviously Party cells also discuss political 
and economic guidelines at the local or national lev-
els. Moreover, the Party is an institutional setting 
where the individuals expand their personal network. 
From this perspective, Party affiliation can be seen as 
a source of information as well as a relational setting 
potentially rich in influential ties. Access to reliable 
information and influential contacts along bureau-
cratic power are key factors that, according to the so-
called power conversion thesis (Staniszkis, 1991), al-
lowed Party members to reach economically profit-
able positions during the institutional transition 
from socialism to capitalism in East Europe coun-
tries.
Taking the above into account, the hypothesis about 
the Party membership’s effect on the attainment of 
non-managerial positions in emergent sectors relies 
on a set of considerations that can be stated as follows 
below. Considering that:
1. Political trustworthiness is an important creden-
tial, useful to reach elite position such as mana-
gerial positions in state-enterprises and institu-
tions, but with less effort an individual can 
obtain a certificate attesting the correct social 
conduct by other civil institutions (i.e., the 
CDRs, FMC);
2. Jobs in emergent sectors are potentially affected 
in some respects by an ambivalent social percep-
tion due to the fact that public statements pre-
sented the reforms of the 90s as a bitter medicine 
to take with caution (in line with tactics) in or-
der to save the Cuban Revolution;
3. Party members are subject to an indirect but ad-
ditional control over the appropriateness of job 
change during their careers;
it is reasonable to assume that — other things being 
equal — being a Party member is not advantageous 
for an individual willing to engage in the emergent 
sectors. On the contrary, it can become an obstacle.
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Thus, the second hypothesis to be tested is:
Hypothesis 2: Assuming that Party affiliation rep-
resents an encumbrance to move freely towards 
some segment of the labor market, Party member-
ship represents an obstacle to attain those desirable 
non-managerial job positions in emergent sectors.
THE SURVEY (METHOD)
Sampling Techniques
The hypotheses have been tested using a dataset col-
lected in 2011, that is, before the start of the new cy-
cle of economic reforms.4 In the dataset there are two 
basic groups of state-employees:
• the first group (n = 122) is composed of tourism 
agents and guides working as employees of the 
three most important State companies in the 
tourism sector. In fact, tourism agents and 
guides typically represent desirable occupations. 
Therefore, among state-employees in emergent 
sectors there are highly-educated service workers.
• the second group (n = 148) is composed of state-
employees in traditional sectors, for example 
teachers, technicians, office workers, medics, li-
brarians, soldiers. Among these state-employees 
in traditional sectors, professionals and services 
workers and technicians are overrepresented 
(they correspond to 38% and 36% of the sub-
sample, respectively), while the remaining work-
ers are administrators and soldiers (who together 
account for 13% of the sample) and lower blue-
collar workers. 
The fact that both groups of state-employees are 
rather homogeneous in respect to the overrepresenta-
tion of highly-educated workers would contribute to 
make the results conservative. In the total sample, the 
distribution of variables such as race and gender are 
consistent with the distribution among Havana resi-
dents; women and blacks are just slightly overrepre-
sented among state-employees in traditional sectors 
(respectively, +5%, +2.5%).
Twenty-three percent of the total sample is com-
posed by Party members (members of UJC were con-
sidered as Party members). In 1997 Party members 
were 750,000 nationally (see Domínguez, 2002 in 
Henken, 2008). Considering that in 2010 the Cuban 
working age population was about 6.8 million work-
ers, a rough estimation of Party membership as a per-
centage of the Cuban population as a whole could 
range from 10 percent to 15 percent. Therefore, in 
my sample, Party members are slightly overrepresent-
ed; as Party members are overrepresented in both 
groups of state-employees, this fact should not affect 
seriously the results. 
The Questionnaire and Its Operationalization
To test the hypotheses, I used a set of items included 
in the questionnaire. These items are shown in Table 
1. The descriptions of the regressors and the depen-
dent variable (state-employment) are reported in Ta-
ble 2. 
The data lack information on the number of years 
since an individual joined the Party. Therefore, it 
cannot be excluded that a respondent joined the Par-
ty after attaining the current position, but this possi-
bility is unlikely. As stated above, Party membership 
must be sought out and becoming a Party member is 
hard. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that individu-
als occupying economically profitable positions 
would see too few benefits and too many costs in at-
tempting to become a Party member. This is all the 
more true as Party membership does not secure addi-
tional material advantages (Romanò, 2012). Similar-
ly, it cannot be excluded that a respondent left the 
Party after attaining the current position. However, 
due to the severe norms regulating the exit from the 
Party, this possibility is even more unlikely. Discuss-
ing the results it will be evident that these shortcom-
ings of the survey data do not seriously undermine 
the results of the analysis.  
4. Information was collected from May 2010 to January 2011 in La Habana and Varadero, by Cuban students and professors as part of 
a broader research project which is centered on the relationship between brokerage opportunities and wealth. To this end, sampling was 
based on a type of factorial design (Corbetta, 2003) that returned a sample constituted by distinct groups of workers’ categories whose 
brokerage opportunities vary.
Table 1. Components of Questionnaire Used to Test Hypotheses
Profession (whether employee is in emergent sectors or not)
How many years ago has been occupying the position?
Party affiliation
Information source used to attain the current job position:
18. A través de qué vía supo sobre el empleo que hoy tiene? (Por favor, marque sólo una casilla) (v60)
Source: No me acuerdo
Skin color | | Education
Parental education 
Remittances 
Table 2. Variable description
Dependent variable: 
 State-Employment
Categorical:
• state-employment in emergent sectors,
• state-employment in traditional sectors 
(Reference Category)
Independent variable:
 Party affiliation Binary 
 Strong ties Binary. Strong ties are: parents, siblings, other 
relatives and close friends. 
Control variables 
 Sex Binary 
 White Binary 
 Remittances Binary 
 Education Years of school 
 Age Number of years of age
Family background:
• Parental education:
Binary. One of the parents holds university degree
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Results 
Table 3 presents the results of two logistic regressions 
of the attainment of economically advantageous posi-
tions. The models compare the odds of becoming a 
state-employee in emergent sectors (hereinafter, 
ESWs) versus a state-employee in traditional sectors 
(TSWs).
• Model 1 includes control variables that refer to 
the subjects’ individual attributes and parental 
education, plus another variable (remittances) 
that could potentially interfere with the attain-
ment of a desirable position. 
• Model 2 includes the control variables and the 
two independent variables representing each hy-
pothesis. 
Session I. Job position 
Session II. Relational data 
• Por mis padres, mis hermanos o hermanas 
• or otros familiares 
• Por un amigo cercano 
• Por un conocido
• Por una agencia o servicio estatal de empleo
• Por el periodo de adiestramiento después de graduado al culminar los estudios 
• Por un anuncio
• El jefe me llamó para el trabajo
• Directamente llamé o fui a buscar trabajo
Session V. Socio-demographic data, parental background and family status
Session VI. Incomes
Variables Operationalization variables
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As shown in Table 2, the status of TSWs is taken as 
the reference category of the variable state-employ-
ment.
Table 3. Logit Coefficients for Regression 
of Attainment of an Economically 
Advantageous Position on Selected 
Independent Variables 
Hypotheses Sex –0.34 –0.37
(0.252) (0.220)
Age 0.01 0.01
(0.011) (0.012)
Skin color –0.08 –0.09
(0.267) (0.223)
Education 0.17*** 0.19***
(0.045) (0.049)
Parental Education 0.77** 0.87**
(0.275) (0.294)
Remittances 0.27 0.34
(0.328) (0.308)
Hp 1. ++ Strength of Ties 0.04
(0.289)
Hp 2. - Party affiliation -1.26***
(0.317)
Constant -3.40*** -3.52***
(0.850) (1.051)
Observations 289 270
Pseudo R2 (0.11) (0.12)
Model 2 indicates that, controlling for education, sex 
and the other variables, strong ties by themselves do 
not allow the attainment of desirable positions in 
emergent sectors. To be more precise, the non-signif-
icant coefficients for strong ties in Model 2 indicates 
that turning to strong ties in order to successfully 
complete the job search does not make the attain-
ment of a job in emergent sectors more likely. How-
ever, these results do not imply that in Cuba strong 
ties are not useful to get a job. These non-significant 
coefficients just indicate that about the same percent-
age of individuals in both groups obtained their cur-
rent job — whether desirable or not — by using 
strong ties.
Specifically, about 35 percent of individuals in the 
sample, independently of their attained position, ob-
tained their job by mobilizing parents, other relatives 
or close friends.5 More generally, about 50 percent of 
interviewed subjects reported that they used personal 
contacts (weak or strong) in order to obtain their cur-
rent job position. These data seem to suggest that in 
Cuba it is quite a common practice to turn to per-
sonal ties, especially if strong, in order to successfully 
complete a job search. This result is relatively consis-
tent with the argument about the strength of strong 
ties in socialist societies (Bian and Soon, 1997; Bian, 
2002) and it is relatively consistent also with the re-
sults from CIPS’s study (Espina-Prieto and Togores-
González, 2012). In fact, this latter study points out 
that access to personal networks informing about va-
cancies combined with qualifications makes it more 
likely that an individual will obtain a profitable posi-
tion in the emergent sectors. 
As seen above, other social mobility studies utilizing 
network perspective suggest that the successful at-
tainment of a desirable position is explained by the 
high status of mobilized contacts (Lin, 1999; 2004). 
Unfortunately, my data do not allow investigating if 
the attainment of desirable positions is explained by 
the high status of the mobilized contacts. As shown 
in subsection above, the questionnaire collected in-
formation about how the subjects knew about the va-
cancy that they filled (personal contacts, job an-
nouncement, institutional agencies), but it did not 
include the possibility for the person interviewed to 
indicate the status of the contact who informed them 
about the vacancy. 
However, two findings of this study suggest that also 
in Cuba the opportunity of enjoying support from 
high status contacts makes it more likely that an indi-
vidual will become a state-employee in emergent sec-
tors rather than in traditional sectors. These two 
findings are: the positive and significant effect of pa-
Model 1 Model 2
VARIABLES
ESWs/ 
TSWs
ESWs/ 
TSWs
Expected sign
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
***p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
5. Conversely, less than 10 percent of individuals attained their job position by utilizing weak ties — this percentage is almost identical 
in both groups.
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rental education in both models and the fact that 
many of the sample’s individuals turned to strong 
contacts (parents, relatives and close friends) in order 
to obtain the current position. 
Turning to Party affiliation, the negative and signifi-
cant coefficient in Model 2 indicates that being a 
Party member makes it less likely that an individual 
will become a state-employee in an emergent sector 
than a state-employee in a traditional sector. There-
fore, Hypothesis 2 is confirmed.6
This finding appears to refute the simple idea that 
the Cuban Revolution survives by highly rewarding 
the Party’s own members. In fact, the results seem to 
indicate that in the last 20 years, Party membership 
has not provided additional advantages in attaining 
profitable positions in state-emergent sectors. On the 
contrary, they suggest that Party membership has re-
duced the chances of reaching a considerable number 
of economically profitable non-managerial positions. 
In other words, results from this study seem to indi-
cate that the defense of frontiers separating different 
economic principles has been successfully maintained 
within the Party. 
I hope that future research efforts will investigate a 
more diverse sample of state-employees in emergent 
sectors — namely a sample that does not include only 
positions in front-office with tourists — in order to 
explore more extensively the Party membership’s ef-
fect on the attainment of these positions. Moreover, 
further research could reveal whether the negative ef-
fect of Party membership on the attainment of desir-
able positions in emergent sectors remains true in the 
new context of reforms, in which market reforms are 
no longer presented as a sort of necessary evil to be 
reversed as soon possible. 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Due to characteristics of the sampling design, the re-
sults from this study must be considered cautiously. 
Nonetheless, these results are relatively consistent 
with most of the literature on the effects of party af-
filiation and use of personal contacts on the status at-
tainment processes in reforming state socialism.
In addition, this study is innovative with respect to 
prior studies on inequality in Cuba because it empir-
ically explores both the effects of Party membership 
and of personal networks (and their characteristics) 
on the attainment of profitable positions.
In so doing, results from this study suggest at least 
two issues whose potential consequences need atten-
tion. Firstly, resorting to strong ties to attain job-po-
sitions is prone to an anti-egalitarian tendency. Due 
to their nature, if strong ties are meant to secure the 
reproduction of class privileges, then they are bound 
to undermine Cuba’s equality-based policies.
The second issue refers to the relation between in-
equality and institutional change dynamic in Cuba. 
Even though findings from this study should be rep-
licated using a statistically representative sample of 
the Cuban population, the negative effect of Party 
membership combined with the positive effect of pa-
rental education suggests that high status families 
might retain their occupations in traditional sectors 
but mobilize their high status contacts to facilitate 
the entrance of their offspring in profitable emergent 
sectors. Therefore, I hope that these initial findings 
on network effects will entice future research on so-
cial mobility in order to shed further light on the 
mechanisms responsible for inequality in Cuba and 
on the relation between inequality and dynamics of 
institutional change. 
6. Running this model on a sub-dataset constructed ad hoc in which individuals who do not reach tertiary education and administra-
tors and soldiers were excluded, the results (not shown) indicate once again that coefficient of Party membership is significant and neg-
ative (-1.08*).
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